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BOOK REVIEWS
LAW AND POLITICS. By Felix Frankfurter. New York: Harcourt, Brace &
Co., 1939, pp. xxiv, 352.
In 1896, an immigrant lad of twelve arrived in the United States. His
native tongues were German and Hungarian. In the course of time, the lad
grew up, and became a renowned professor at Harvard Law School. In 1938,
the National Institute for Immigrant Welfare bestowed upon him its achieve-
ment award.' In January, 1939, the President of the United States appointed
him Justice of the Supreme Court, successor to Justice Cardozo, and Justice
Frankfurter (the one-time immigrant lad), after a quarter of a century of law
teaching at the Harvard Law School, left the professor's dais for the judge's
bench. Two of his former law students 2 have collected and published excerpts
from books, law review articles, public addresses, book reviews, magazine
articles, and editorials, which he wrote during the quarter-century span. The
papers have been grouped into eight divisions: The Supreme Court, The Ele-
ments of Judicial Greatness, The Liberties of a Free People, Labor and the
Courts, Government and Administration, Business and the Courts, Law and
Science, and A Political Autobiography. Here is a wealth of opinion on a
diversity of legal-economic problems affecting the state politic. I select for
consideration and comment The Elements of Judicial Greatness.
The Elements of Judicial Greatness include Frankfurter's six papers on
"Three Great Justices"-Holmes, Cardozo, and Brandeis.
The first Holmes paper-Justice Holmes Defines the Constitution--appeared
in 1938 in the Atlantic Monthly.3 The second Holmes paper-The Early Writ-
ings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr.-originally appeared in 1931 in the Harvard Law
Review in celebration of the 90th birthday of Justice Holmes.
The first Cardozo paper-Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law--originally
appeared in January, 1939, as one of a group of essays published jointly by the
Harvard Law Review, the Columbia Law Review, and the Yale Law Journal,
and dedicated to the memory of Justice Cardozo. The second Cardozo paper-
When Judge Cardozo Writes-originally appeared in 1931 in the New Republic
as a book review of Cardozo's Law and Literature.
The first Brandeis paper-Brandeis--originally appeared in 1916 as an
unsigned editorial in the New Republic, shortly after President Wilson's nomi-
nation of Mr. Brandeis to the Supreme Court. The second Brandeis paper-
Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution--originally appeared in 1931 in the
Harvard Law Review in celebration of the 75th birthday of Justice Brandeis.
' On this occasion, Professor Frankfurter gave eloquent expression to the
gratitude of the immigrant to this his Promised Land for the historic hospi-
tality extended to those who sought its liberty, and for the freedom to partici-
pate in its fellowship.
2 Archibald MacLeish, one time editor of the Harvard Law Review, now
poet, writer and librarian of the Library of Congress, and E. F. Prichard, also
one time editor of the Harvard Law Review.
3 Prior thereto, it appeared in Frankfurter's book, MR. JUSTICE HoLmES
AND THE SUPREME COURT (1938).
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Long before Holmes took his seat on the Supreme Court bench in 1902, he
had achieved distinction as a legal scholar and as an eminent judge of the
Massachusetts Court. The Commons Law, published in 1881, and still a legal
classic, was the inspiration for much of the progress in modern historical and
philosophic jurisprudence.4
Holmes' enduring contribution to American jurisprudence was his constitu-
tional philosophy. To him, the Constitution was an organic living institution,
and not a mathematical formula.5 The significance of the provisions of the
Constitution, said Holmes, "is to be gathered not simply by taking the words
and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth".
6
The great theme of his judicial life, wrote Frankfurter, was "the amplitude of
the Constitution as against the narrowness of some of its interpreters'.
7
Holmes' justiceship on the Supreme Court covered thirty years, one-fifth
of the life of the Court, and one-third of its adjudications.8
When Holmes resigned in 1932, the nation was unanimous in the conviction
that Cardozo was his natural successor. 9 Cardozo was deeply honored by the
general acclaim and the invitation of President Hoover to be the successor to
Holmes.' 0 He accepted, but not without some hesitancy at leaving his brethren
on the New York Court of Appeals.
Justice Cardozo sat on the bench of the Supreme Court for less than six
years." But they were turbulent years, replete with meaning in the economic
life of the nation. The times demanded keen intellect, forthright courage, and
bold steering. Pilots sought to steady the Ship of State by ameliorative legis-
4 Holmes, wrote Frankfurter in 1931, "was born invincibly to ask the
meaning of things and to cut beneath the skin of formulas, however re-
spectable." P. 84.
5 A "constitution", wrote Holmes, "is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen
to the state or of laissez-faire." "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Pp. 75, 74.
6P. 71.
7P. 75. The Supreme Court has been the supreme interpreter of the Con-
stitution but "the history of the Supreme Court", Frankfurter reminded us,
"is not the history of an abstraction, but the analysis of individuals acting as a
Court who make decisions and lay down doctrines * * *. In law also men
make a difference." P. 62. "His deepest allegiance", wrote Frankfurter on
Holmes' 90th birthday, "is to civilization-a civilization neither parochial nor
utopian, but groping for realization on the stage of the new world as part of
the whole world." P. 87.
8 P. 63.
9 "The history of the Supreme Court affords no analogue to the unanimity
of lay as well as professional opinion that Chief Judge Cardozo was the one
man adequate to fill the historic place vacated by Holmes." P. 89.
10 Cardozo referred to Holmes as "the Master". This "was not merely
the language of playful deference which made Cardozo always speak of Holmes
as 'the Master'." P. 88.
11 Cardozo was appointed February 24th, 1932 and died July 9th, 1938.
Absence on account of illness before his death reduced his participation in the
work of the Court.
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lation. Much of it was poorly conceived.' 2 Most of it was nobly conceived,
and was destined to run the gauntlet of Constitutional challenge.
Cardozo, like Holmes and Brandeis, sharply differentiated between the
responsibility of the judge and the discretion of the legislator. "A motive to
build up through legislation the quality of men may be as creditable in the
thought of some as a motive to magnify the quantity of trade. Courts do not
choose between such values in adjudging legislative powers. They put the
choice aside as beyond their lawful competence." So wrote Justice Cardozo in
an opinion sustaining a West Virginia graduated chain organization tax.
1 3
"In the domain of economic affairs," wrote Frankfurter, "Cardozo walked
humbly"; 14 here, Brandeis was his superior, though Cardozo should be credited
for his part in the development of the law governing the duties of the corporate
fiduciary.1 5 But his enduring contribution to the Supreme Court was his sense
of moral grandeur and human values; here, he was unmatched. Man, made in
the image of his Maker, took on for him a new spiritual form. There is no
parallel, wrote Frankfurter in 1939, "to the deep feeling of the country as a
whole that the death of Cardozo was not merely the premature termination of a
distinguished judicial career, but the end of the living energy of one of the
most powerful moral resources of the nation." 16 "It is astonishing," he wrote
in the same paper, "that so cloistered a spirit should have attained such a hold
on popular feeling." 17
In the life of a nation, as ii the life of an individual, many an event has
consequences which are immediately disturbing but ultimately salutary. Presi-
dent Wilson's nomination of Mr. Brandeis to the Supreme Court in 1916
brought on an avalanche of ugly criticism, protest and vituperation. For many
years, Brandeis, as the "People's Lawyer", had been the center of controversy,
and his foes now determined to prevent his confirmation. A Senate Committee
conducted an investigation to determine his fitness, and nation-wide discussion
as to the r6le of the Supreme Court.in the life of the nation ensued. Frank-
12 "Fallible wisdom", wrote Frankfurter, "produces fallible legislation. To
deny government the right to act except with omniscience and prescience is to
deny it the right to act at all." P. 95.
13 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87, 100, 101, 55 Sup. Ct. 333 (1935),
cited at p. 93. Continuing, Justice Cardozo wrote: "The tax now assailed
may have its roots in an erroneous conception of the ills of the body politic
or of the efficacy of such a measure to bring about a cure. We have no
thought in anything we have written to declare it expedient or even just, or
for that matter to declare the contrary. We deal with power only." In an
opinion sustaining the Social Security Act, he reiterated the same constitutional
principle: "Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of benefits set
forth in Title II, it is not for us to say. The answer to such inquiries must
come from Congress, not the courts. Our concern here, as often, is with
power, not with wisdom." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 644, 57 Sup. Ct.
904 (1937), cited at p. 100.
14 P. 96.
'15 McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U. S. 140, 56 Sup. Ct. 41 (1935) ; dissenting






furter espoused the Brandeis cause. The nominee, he wrote, was pre-eminently
fitted for the post, and possessed "the passion of public service and the genius
for it".18 Brandeis' past assured his conformity with the teaching of Chief
Justice Marshall that it is a "Constitution that we are construing, a great charter
of government with all the implications that dynamic government means".
The questions before the Supreme Court, wrote Frankfurter, were "not abstrac-
tions to be determined by empty formula". Brandeis had devoted his whole life
to the consideration of public questions, and had "amassed experience enjoyed
by hardly another lawyer to the same depth and richness and detail". 9 After
months of investigation, the Senate confirmed the Brandeis nomination.2 0 The
liberals had, won; the reactionaries had lost; and the nation had learned much
about constitutional construction. The conflict had salutary consequences.
Brandeis' enduring contribution to the Supreme Court during the twenty-
three years of his justiceship was his scientific approach to legal .problems. No
one who has graced the Supreme Court bench was so thoroughly familiar with
economic problems. He was the Supreme Court's chief economist. His opin-
ions on valuation of public utilities and rate fixing,21 the right of a state to
experiment with the limitation of production through the use of the certificate
of public convenience and necessity,22 the limitation of undue corporate expan-
sion and the use of progressive chain store taxation, 23 and the desirability of
consonance between the general law of the federal courts and the state courts,2 4
are classics in economics and political theory. His plea for the right of the
several states to experiment in social and economic controls, unhampered by
federal judicial interference, is a scientist's affirmation of faith in the doctrine
of state sovereignty. "To stay experimentation in things social and economic,"
wrote Brandeis," is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment
may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel, social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. *** If we would guide by the light of
reason, we must let our minds be bold" 25
In law's Hall of Fame, Holmes the philosopher, Cardozo the moralist, and
Brandeis the economist, will have conspicuous places. In no small measure has
18 p. 112.
3. Pp. 109, 110.
20 See Hearngx and Report on Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis, Sen. No.
409, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
21 Dissenting opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923).
22 Dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262,
52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
23 Dissenting opinion in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53
Sup. Ct. 481 (1933).
24 Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
25 Dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262,
311, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932). "To quote-from Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinions",
wrote Frankfurter, "is not to pick plums from a pudding, but to pull threads
from a pattern. He achieves not by epigrammatic thrust but through powerful
exposition. * ** His opinions march step by step towards demonstration, with
all the auxiliary reinforcement of detailed proof." P. 125.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter contributed to the perpetuation of the memory of
"Three Great Justices". I like to think of the many readers of these collected
legal papers as visitors to my imaginary Hall of Fame.
Louis PRASHKER.*
Loox AT THE LAW. By Percival E. Jackson. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1940,
pp. 377.
The author of this book is an eminent lawyer, with many years of experi-
ence, whose work typifies the concept of the people's lawyer and whose interests
in law spring from a desire to view it and to help make it an effective vehicle
for social control in a democratic society. The enthusiastic reception which
this book was accorded at the hands of lawyers and laymen alike is a heartening
indication of the trend of modern juristic thought.
The facts detailed in this volume are of utmost importance to the modem
public. They are facts which law schools are apt to overlook. Where interests
are necessarily confined to theoretical exposition, the distempers of the law in
practice are all too frequently ignored. Here is a book which gives to the law
student an opportunity to peer behind the scenes and to see how the standards
and principles that are worked out in the classroom fare when they are applied
in the courts. The author is not unaware of the difficulties confronting the task
which he has so efficiently accomplished. He is conscious of the deep responsi-
bility which rests upon anyone who would undertake an analysis of the legal
system from its practical point of view, but he has a gift for clear and trenchant
statement and for calling things by their right names. He employs this art
dexterously to reveal the fundamental deficiencies of the legal system as it is
applied to the courts and to suggest some thoroughly sensible remedies, which
certainly will not be long in forthcoming.
Mr. Jackson is not an iconoclast. His suggestions are not destructive and
his view of the law does not indicate any hopelessness or any feeling of ultimate
despair. On the contrary, throughout the book runs an optimistic note and one
gets the feeling that the author is conscious of the considerable progress that
has already been made and confident that more is bound to come. Without
sparing the sensibilities of lawyers or judges, he yet is able to cast blame only
where it belongs and to recognize the essential soundness that exists in the basic
concepts of our legal system. He says, speaking of law: "Generally, far from
being condemned for its hypocrisies, it should be praised for its ability to
reconcile law and life, for its effort to obtain a balance between the require-
ments of justice and the calls of mercy." Speaking of the law's delays, he
weighs a careful balance between a radical innovation and progress, pointing out
that "we must be careful to limit the pruning of technicalities so that matters of
substance are not emasculated".
He has something specific and detailed to say about almost every branch of
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
